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Abstract 
In this paper we estimate the sorting effects of university degree class on initial labor market 
outcomes using a regression discontinuity design that exploits institutional rules governing 
the award of degrees. Consistent with anecdotal evidence, we find sizeable and significant 
effects for Upper Second degrees and positive but smaller effects for First Class degrees on 
wages. In additional results we explore differences across groups and find evidence 
consistent with a simple model of statistical discrimination on the basis of gender and types 
of degree programmes. When we split the sample by ability, we find that the signaling effects 
are similar in the high ability group but stronger for Upper Second degrees in the lower 
ability group. The evidence points to the importance of sorting in the high skills labor market.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we estimate the sorting (signaling or screening) effects of university degree
class on labor market outcomes. As we explain below, the degree classification is a system of
categorizing performance on university degree programmes in the United Kingdom (UK). The
importance of the system is highlighted by the sizeable fraction of employers who report using
the classification in hiring decisions and by universities that use degree class to screen applicants
to postgraduate programmes. However, it is not obvious that the classification system is useful
because degree transcripts provide more information about applicant quality. Finding any effect
would suggest the presence of sorting in the skill market.
Using survey and administrative data from the London School of Economics and Political
Science (LSE), we find significant effects of degree class on initial labor market outcomes.
An Upper Second earns 7 percent higher wages compared to a Lower Second while a First
Class earns 3 percent higher wages compared to an Upper Second. However we find no
significant effects on the extensive margin of employment. These results are robust to a battery
of specification checks and suggestive of sorting in the high skills labor market.
In additional results we explore differences across groups and find evidence consistent
with a simple model of statistical discrimination on the basis of gender and types of degree
programmes. Males, quantitative degrees and degrees with less course choices appear to display
larger signaling effects. When we split the sample by ability, we find that signaling effects are
similar in the high ability group but stronger for Upper Second degrees in the lower ability
group.
Identifying the sorting effects of degree class is complicated by the fact that a naive compari-
son of, say, students who received a First Class with students who received an Upper Second
could be biased by the differing ability composition of the two groups. In this paper, we adopt
a regression discontinuity design (RD) that exploits institutional rules governing the award
of degree class on the basis of marks received on courses taken. This amounts to comparing
students who barely made and barely missed a degree class within a narrow window of the
marks received. We argue that this generates quasi-experimental variation needed for clean
identification of degree class effects.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. Broadly, the signaling theory of education
suggests that education provides a signal of unobserved worker productivity (Spence 1973).
In the simplest model there is no productive role of education in human capital acquisition
although this consideration does not alter the basic predictions of the theory: high ability
types choose more education to separate themselves from low ability types (Riley 1979).
Notice that both the Becker (1964) theory of human capital and signaling theories predict
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a positive correlation between ability and education. Thus discriminating between the two
theories has proven challenging empirically (Weiss 1995). Complementing the signaling theories
are screening models where employers take actions to separate workers into ability groups
(Stiglitz 1975, Wolpin 1977). We follow Weiss (1995) in collectively describing these classes of
signaling and screening theories as sorting models.
Empirical testing of sorting models has proceeded in two ways. Indirect evidence comes in
the form of changes in the human capital investment decisions of one ability group from changes
in the decisions made in other groups. Compulsory schooling laws for primary education that
affect higher education groups (Lang and Kropp 1986) or tertiary enrolment changes that affect
the high school margin (Bedard 2001) are seen as consistent with the signaling value of education
but not human capital theories. More direct evidence imagines a randomized experiment where
randomly selected individuals from the same ability group get treated with an educational signal.
Tyler, Murnane, and Willet (2002) mimic this experiment by exploiting differences in passing
standards for the GED diploma across US states. Their finding of significant effects for white
males stands in contrast to Clark and Martorell (2010) who find no effects for receiving the high
school diploma.
For tertiary education the early literature looked at the credential effects associated the
completion of college degrees (Layard and Psacharopoulos 1974). Hungerford and Solon
(1987), Belman and Heywood (1991) and Jaeger and Page (1996) include dummy variables for
college completion in Mincer (1974) regressions and interpret the significant effects of college
completion as signals of underlying correlates of productivity. In papers most closely related
to ours, Di Pietro (2010), Ireland, Naylor, Smith, and Telhaj (2009) and McKnight, Naylor,
and Smith (2007) examine the signaling effects of degree classification for students in the UK.
Notably Di Pietro (2010) adopts a regression discontinuity design using final year marks and
finds no effect on employment. We get similar results and extend the analysis by looking at
wage differences. Ireland, Naylor, Smith, and Telhaj (2009) use OLS regressions and find 4 and
5 percent returns to First Class and Upper Second degrees respectively. Their sample consists of
a much larger dataset of UK students across many universities and years but does not have the
course history information we have to construct finer comparison groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the institutional setting,
in Section 3 we explore the data sources and empirical strategy, in Section 4 we present our
results and specification checks. Section 5 explores heterogeneity across programmes and ability
groups. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude.
2
2 Institutional Setting
2.1 University Description
Our data comes from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). LSE
is a top ranked public research university located in London, UK, specializing in the social
sciences. LSE offers a range of degree programmes and admission is highly competitive. In
2012, LSE students came top for employability in the Sunday Times University Guide with over
three quarters of students in employment or further studies six months after graduating. Our
results thus speak to the high end of the skills market within a selective tertiary institution.1
2.2 UK Degree Classification
The degree classification system in the UK is a grading scheme for degrees. The highest
distinction for an undergraduate is the First Class honors followed by the Upper Second, Lower
Second, Third Class and Pass degrees. While all universities in the UK follow this classification
scheme, each university has the power and discretion to apply its own standards and rules to
determine the distribution of degrees. The system has been applied in other countries including
Australia, Canada, India and many Commonwealth nations. In the US, a system of grade
point averages (GPA) and Latin Honors performs the similar purpose of classifying degrees. In
principle, this implies that our results apply to a broad range of countries.2 Anecdotal evidence
points to the increasing importance of degree class in hiring decisions. One report points to
75 percent of employers in 2012 requiring at least an Upper Second degree as minimum entry
requirement especially for competitive jobs–this compares to 52 percent in 2004.3
2.3 LSE Degree Classification Rules
To construct our identification strategy, we exploit a unique feature of the rules governing
the award of degree class. Undergraduates in the LSE take nine courses over three years. Every
course is graded out of 100 marks and fixed thresholds are used to map the marks to degree
class. As shown in Table B.1, a First Class Honors degree requires 5 marks of 70 or above or 4
marks of 70 or above with aggregate marks of at least 590. This mapping from course marks to
final degree class applies to all departments and years.4
1See LSE website http://www2.lse.ac.uk/intranet/CareersAndVacancies/
graduateDestinations/6monthson.aspx.
2See wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_undergraduate_degree_
classification and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin_honors. The GPA is usually a
scale from 0 to 4 with one decimal accuracy and is a finer measure of performance than the UK system. There have
been calls to scrap the UK system in favor of a US-style points system, the Guardian, July 9th 2012.
3See the Daily Telegraph, July 4th 2012 and the Guardian, July 4th 2012.
4Four courses are taken each year, however only the average of the best three courses in the first year
counts towards final classification. Undergraduate law students are an exception and follow a different set of
rules. We exclude them from all analyses. Full details of the classification system is available online at http:
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We exploit the discontinuous relationship between degree class and marks received on the
fourth highest mark in a regression discontinuity design (RD). Our strategy is intuitive and
amounts to comparing otherwise similar students who differ only in a critical course mark which
determines their final degree class. To be specific, let us consider the award of a First Class
degree which depends on the receipt of at least four first class marks. This suggests that the
fourth highest mark for any student plays a critical role in determining the degree class. A
student whose fourth highest mark is larger than 70 is much more likely to obtain a First Class
degree than a student whose mark just missed 70, everything else equal. This can be seen clearly
in Figure 1 which plots the fraction of students who receive a First Class degree against their
fourth highest mark received. There is a clear jump in the probability of receiving a First Class
after the 70-mark threshold. A similar story can be seen in the award of an Upper Second degree
at the 60-mark threshold. To summarize, the fourth highest mark plays the role of the assignment
variable in our RD strategy.
In reality, we employ a fuzzy RD design because there are complications to the rules. As
shown in Table B.1 there is an aggregate mark requirement. Additionally, a failed course
results in a downgrade in degree class.5 These caveats do not threaten our research design
because they are not applied on a case-by-case basis but are applied impartially at the department
level.6 Nevertheless it moves us away from a sharp RD design. We explore in detail the first-
stage relationship between degree class and fourth highest mark in Section 4.1 and show that
the relevant complier population is sizeable so that our results generalize to the larger LSE
population.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Students’ Demographics and Course History
From student records we obtain age, gender, nationality and country of domicile information.
Course history includes information on degree programme, courses taken and grades awarded,
and eventual degree classification. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used
in our analysis. We have 5,912 students in the population from 2005-2010 of which 2,649 are
included in the DLHE survey (described in detail below). Columns (1) and (4) report the mean
and standard deviations of variables for surveyed and non-surveyed students, respectively, while
column (5) reports the difference. Surveyed students are less likely to be female, more likely
to be UK nationals, more likely to receive an Upper Second and less likely to receive a Lower
//www.lse.ac.uk/resources/calendar/academicRegulations/BA-BScDegrees.htm.
5Failed courses can be retaken up to three times and the better grade is used in calculating final degree class.
We control for any failed or retaken courses in our estimation. Students can appeal on specific courses, but this
does not worry us. First, appeals are difficult and rarely successful. Second, a student does not usually know before
the completion of their degree which course is critical in determining their class.
6There could still be a concern if departments can upgrade students who appeal in their final degree classification.
But this would not retroactively change grades on courses taken and reinforces the need to use a fuzzy RD design.
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Second.
To implement our empirical strategy, we further split the surveyed students into two samples.
The First Class sample consists of students who received either a First Class or an Upper Second
and the Upper Second sample consists of students who received either an Upper Second or
Lower Second. This provides two discontinuities that we examine separately and narrows
our comparisons to students who are on either side of each threshold. In Table 1 First Class,
Upper Second and Lower Second are dummy variables for the degree classes. Among all
surveyed students, the majority of 60 percent received an Upper Second with the remaining 40
percent roughly evenly split between First Class and Lower Second. 1[4th MARK ≥ 70] and
1[4th MARK ≥ 60] are dummy variables equal to one if the fourth highest mark is no less than
70 or 60 respectively.7
One shortcoming of this database is that we do not have measures of a student’s pre-university
ability. For a typical UK student this might include his GCSE and A-level results. Although
admissions to LSE programmes require A-level or equivalent results, this data is not collected
centrally but is administered at the department level. While controlling for ability is unnecessary
in our identification strategy it would be useful for improving precision and interesting to check
our results against different ability groups.8 We take some steps to redress this shortcoming.
First in all our regressions we control for department × year interactions. More directly we use
the admissions offers made at the programme level as a measure of student ability. In Table B.3
we classify degree programmes into groups based on A-level requirements. The most stringent
programmes require A*AA grades followed by AAA, AAB and ABB respectively. We also code
a dummy variable indicating A-level mathematics’ requirements for admissions.9 Section 5
presents results exploring heterogeneity over these programme attributes.
3.2 Destination of Leavers from Higher Education Survey
The DLHE survey is a national survey of students who have recently graduated from a
university in the UK. This survey is conducted twice a year to find out employment circumstances
of students six months after graduation.10 Due to the frequency of the survey and its statutory
nature, LSE oversees the survey and reports the results to HESA (Higher Education Statistics
Authority). The survey is sent by email and responded to online and in theory includes all
students including non-domiciled and non-UK nationals. In practice response rates are higher
7We split the sample because anecdotes suggest that the Upper Second threshold may be more important. It
also allows a cleaner non-parametric identification strategy around the two discontinuities. We dropped Third Class
and below because they constituted less than 5 percent of the population. Including them among the Lower Second
population does not change results.
8As noted in Lee and Lemieux (2010) an RD design mimics a natural experiment close to the discontinuity.
Hence there should be no need for additional controls except to improve precision of estimates.
9Results in (McKnight, Naylor, and Smith 2007) suggest that controlling for degree programme reduces the
importance of pre-university academic results.
10The surveys are conducted from November to March for the “January” survey, and from April to June for the
“April” survey.
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for domiciled and UK nationals.11 The survey provides us with data from 2005-2010. Our
key variables of interest are industry and employment status. Industry is coded in four digit
SIC codes, although we aggregate to two digits for merging with LFS data (see Section 3.3).
Employment status is a dummy variable equal to one if a graduate is employed in full-time work.
Self-employed, freelance and voluntary work is coded as zero along with the unemployed or
unable to work.12
Table 1 shows that 85 percent of students who responded are employed within six months
of graduation. More than one-third of students are employed in the finance industry although
this varies slightly across the degree classes. Given the importance of the finance industry, we
construct a dummy variable for employment in finance and look at results excluding the finance
industry.
Because the survey is conducted six months after graduation, we interpret our analysis as
applying to first jobs. Although we do not observe previous job experience and cannot control
for this in our analysis, 98 percent of our students were younger than 21 years of age when
they started their degrees. Thus, any work experience is unlikely to have been in permanent
employment. Also, we cannot follow students over longer periods of employment to examine
the dynamic effects of degrees. While these are limitations of our data, we do not see these as
limitations of our analysis: according to the employer learning and statistical discrimination
models (Altonji and Pierret 2001), any sorting effect from degree class should be most relevant
in the first job.
Another concern is that employment six months after graduation may have been secured
before the final degree class is known. Anecdotes suggest that students start Summer internships,
work experience and job applications prior to graduation.13 While this may explain the insignif-
icant effects we find on employment, it cannot explain the results on wages. Furthermore, if
degree class has no effect for those students who have secured employment, our results would
underestimate the full effects for the students who have not.
3.3 Labor Force Survey
We merge wage data from the LFS into the DLHE survey at the industry × year × gender
level. We calculate mean log hourly wages for each industry × year × gender cell unconditional
on skills or experience. One concern with this approach is that mean wages are not representative
of the earnings facing undergraduates. To address this concern we also calculate mean log wages
conditional on university and three experience levels. To match the labor market prospects of
undergraduates we chose 1, 3 and 5 years of potential experience. To ensure that the finance
industry is not driving our results, we look at wages for the sub-sample of students not employed
in finance.
11Formally, LSE is required to reach a response rate of 80 percent for UK nationals and 50 percent for others.
12An annual salary question is included but response is voluntary and had too many missing values.
13Although many employers may offer jobs conditional on the final degree class.
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This gives us five different measures of industry wages–overall mean, university with 1, 3
and 5 years of experience and overall mean for non-finance industries. Our preferred measure is
the overall mean because it provides a clean measure of the industry’s “rank” compared to other
industries. In any case the five measures are highly correlated with pairwise correlations never
less than 0.8. Table 1 shows that the mean log wage is 2.45 which is roughly £11.60 per hour in
2005£. As expected, industry wages increase in years of experience.
Using industry wages implies that we do not have within-industry variation in outcomes. To
the extent that within-industry comparisons matter, our results will not be representative of the
true effects of degrees. We acknowledge that this is an imperfect measure and are cautious in
interpreting our results as effects on industry not individual wages.14 Table B.2 shows the top 15
industries ranked by total share of employment. Even accounting for the large share in finance,
there is substantial distribution in employment across industries–of the 84 two-digit SIC codes,
66 are represented in our data.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
Our unit of observation is a student. For each student we observe his degree classification
and his course grades. In particular, we observe his fourth highest mark out of nine courses
taken over three years of the degree. As described in Section 2.3, institutional rules imply that
the fourth highest mark is critical in determining his degree class. When the fourth highest
mark crosses the 70-mark or 60-mark cutoff, there is a discontinuous jump in the probability of
receiving a First Class and Upper Second respectively. In Section 4.4 we show that including
the other marks as controls does not change our results.
Identification in an RD setup requires two assumptions (Lee and Lemieux 2010). First,
agents cannot precisely manipulate the assignment variable. Second, apart from the treatment–in
this case degree class–all other observables and unobservables vary continuously across the
threshold. The first assumption cannot directly be tested although institutional knowledge and
the McCrary test provide supporting evidence. These are discussed in Section 4.2. The second
assumption can be tested using data on observables once the assignment variable has been
controlled for flexibly. Flexible control of the assignment variable can be done in several ways.
A parametric function such as a high order polynomial is parsimonious but is found to be quite
sensitive to polynomial order (Angrist and Pischke 2009). A non-parametric approach observes
that a regression discontinuity can be thought of as a kernel regression at a boundary point
(Imbens and Lemieux 2008). This motivates the use of local regressions with various kernels
and bandwidths (Fan and Gijbels 1996, Li and Racine 2007).15
In our benchmark specification we use the simplest non-parametric local linear regression
14The lack of a more direct wage measure is an issue for other studies in the literature as well (Di Pietro 2010,
McKnight, Naylor, and Smith 2007).
15Regression discontinuity was introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and formalized in the
language of treatment effects by Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001).
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with a rectangular bandwidth of 5 marks above and below the cutoff (Imbens and Wooldridge
2009). This means we include the fourth mark linearly and interacted with the dummy variable as
additional controls. In specification checks we vary the bandwidth and try polynomial functions
to flexibly control for the fourth mark. As discussed in Section 4.4 these specification checks
produce consistent results. The non-deterministic relationship between fourth highest mark and
degree class means that in practice we employ a fuzzy RD design. This uses the fourth highest
mark as an instrument for degree class.16
In theory, identification in an RD setup comes in the limit as we approach the discontinuity
asymptotically (Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001). In practice, this requires sufficient
data around the boundary points–as we get closer to the discontinuity estimates tend to get less
precise because we have fewer data. Furthermore, when the assignment variable is discrete
by construction, there is the additional complication that we cannot approach the boundary
infinitesimally.17 In this paper, we choose the 5 mark bandwidth as a reasonable starting point
and accept that some of the identification necessarily comes from marks away from the boundary.
We follow Lee and Card (2008) in correcting standard errors for the discrete structure of our
assignment variable by clustering on marks throughout.
We can write the first-stage equation as:
CLASSi(1)
=δ0 + δ11[4th MARK ≥ cutoff]i + δ2(4th MARKi − cutoff)+
δ3(4th MARKi − cutoff)× 1[4th MARK ≥ cutoff]i +Xiδ4 + ui
where CLASS is either First Class or Upper Second and the cutoff is 70 or 60 respectively.
1[4th MARK ≥ cutoff] is a dummy variable for the fourth mark crossing the cutoff and our
instrument for the potentially endogenous degree class. X is a vector of covariates including
female dummies, age and age squared, dummies for being a UK national, dummies for having
resat or failed any course, 15 dummies for department, 5 year dummies and 75 dummies for
department × year interactions.
We can use the predicted degree class from our first-stage regression in our second-stage
equation:
Yi =β0 + β1CLASSi + β2(4th MARKi − cutoff)+(2)
β3(4th MARKi − cutoff)× 1[4th MARK ≥ cutoff]i +Xiβ4 + i
where Y are various labor market outcomes including employment status, employment in finance
16The close connection between fuzzy RD and instrumental variables is noted in Lee and Lemieux (2010),
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). Instead of the usual exclusion restrictions,
however, we require the continuity assumption and non-manipulation of the assignment variable.
17This is also a problem facing designs where age in years or months is the assignment variable, e.g. Carpenter
and Dobkin (2009).
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industry and five measures of industry wages.
4 Results
4.1 First-Stage and Reduced Form Regressions
In this section we look at estimates of the first-stage Equation (1) and the reduced form
regressions:
Yi =γ0 + γ11[4th MARK ≥ cutoff]i + γ2(4th MARKi − cutoff)+(3)
γ3(4th MARKi − cutoff)× 1[4th MARK ≥ cutoff]i +Xiγ4 + νi
where Y are the various labor market outcomes. Table 2, column (1) reports the first-stage
results for the First Class discontinuity (panel A) and Upper Second discontinuity (panel B).
Both first-stage F-statistics are above the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 and mitigates any
concerns about weak instruments (Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002).18 In order to better interpret
the first-stage, we can look at the relationship between fourth highest mark and degree class
without controlling for any covariates. This also allows us to do a simple count of the complier
population in LSE (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996, Imbens and Angrist 1994). In Figure 2
the schematic shows the breakdown of students into compliers, always takers and never takers
around the discontinuity. For instance, always takers are students who receive a First Class
regardless of their fourth highest mark, while compliers are students who receiver a First Class
because their fourth highest mark crosses the threshold. The breakdown suggests that the
complier population is sizeable at 87 percent. This is expected because the institutional rules are
strictly followed and supports the validity of our results to the rest of the LSE population.
Columns (2) to (8) regress the outcome variables on the excluded instrument always control-
ling for covariates. In panel A, the small magnitudes and insignificant results suggest that the
First Class may not be important in labor market outcomes. The larger and significant results for
Upper Second in panel B are consistent with the idea that an Upper Second is important as a
signal or screening device for employers.
4.2 Randomization Checks and McCrary Test
As discussed in Section 3.4, identification in an RD setup requires continuity in the observ-
ables (and unobservables) across the threshold as well as non-manipulation of the assignment
variable. To test for continuity in the observables, we regress each covariate on the treatment
dummy in Table 3, columns (1) to (5). Apart from age in the First Class sample and gender
in the Upper Second sample, the results are consistent with the lack of discontinuity in the
18The sample size varies over outcome variables but we confirmed that the first-stage and other results are not
sensitive to these sample differences.
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observables. The apparent discontinuity in age and gender does not worry us because these are
non-manipulable attributes (Holland 1986). In other words, there is less concern that agents
could have taken actions to manipulate these attributes around the discontinuity to improve their
degree class. This would be the case if we saw discontinuities in the students who resat or failed
any courses.
To test for the manipulation of the assignment variable itself, McCrary (2008) suggests using
the frequency count as the dependent variable in the RD setup. The idea is that manipulation of
the assignment variable should result in bunching of individuals at the cutoff. In the education
literature, this was shown to be an important invalidation of the RD approach (see for e.g.
Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009)). In our case, we should see a jump in the number of students
at the threshold of 70 or 60 marks. In column (6) of Table 3 we perform the McCrary test and
find large and (in the case of the Upper Second threshold) significant jumps in the number of
students. Prima facie this might suggest that students are manipulating their marks in order to
receive better degrees.
We argue that this bunching is not the result of manipulation but is a consequence of
institutional features. Figure 3 plots the histogram of the fourth, fifth and highest marks. In
every case there is a clear bunching of marks at 60 and 70 even for the highest mark which
is not critical for eventual degree class. This is because exam graders actively avoid giving
borderline marks (i.e. 59 or 69) and either round up or down.19 One may still worry that students
who received 58 or 68 may appeal to have their script re-graded. From discussions with staff,
the appeals process is arduous and rarely successful. Nonetheless we follow the literature in
dealing with the potential manipulation of marks by excluding the threshold in specification
checks reported in Section 4.4 (see for e.g. Almond and Doyle (2011)). This does not change
our results.
4.3 Effects of Degree Class on Labor Market Outcomes
Table 4 reports the results for the effects of receiving a First Class degree compared with an
Upper Second. In panel A, we compare average differences in outcomes without controlling for
any covariates. There are no differences in employment in general or in the finance industry
specifically. However, there are significant differences in industry wages. Using our preferred
measure of mean industry log wages, a First Class receives 7 percent higher wages. Panel B
includes covariates to allow for closer comparisons of students. This corresponds to Equation (2).
The employment outcomes remain insignificant while the wage coefficients halve but remain
significant. Finally in panel C, we instrument for First Class using a dummy variable for the
fourth highest mark, as in Equation (1). Although the difference in industry mean wages remains
significant at 5 percent, the conditional experience measures are insignificant suggesting that the
19In LSE, exams are taken anonymously and each script is graded by one internal and one external examiner.
Having graded each script separately, graders convene to deliberate on the final mark.
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wage differences for a First Class are not sizeable.
Table 5 reports the same specifications as Table 4 but for the Upper Second degree. Sur-
prisingly, there are no differences in average outcomes across students without controlling for
covariates in panel A. This is because of inter-departmental comparisons we are making in
the absence of department fixed effects. Once we control for covariates including department
by year fixed effects in panel B we observe that an Upper Second receives 4 percent higher
wages than a Lower Second. An Upper Second also has a 7 percentage point (20 percent) higher
probability of working in finance. Using the threshold dummy variable 1[4th MARK ≥ 60] as
an instrument for Upper Second, panel C reveals that the returns are significant and sizeable at 7
percent for mean wages and 12 percentage points (37 percent) for finance industry employment.
To interpret these results we translate the percentage differences to pounds. Using our
preferred measure of wages in the specification in column (3) we find that a First Class and
Upper Second are worth around £1,000 and £2,040 per annum respectively in current money.20
4.4 Specification Checks
Here we conduct a battery of specification tests for our benchmark models given in panels
C of Table 4 and Table 5. In Table 6 we report checks for the First Class degree while Table 7
reports the same for Upper Second. Row (1) reports the benchmark results for convenience.
Rows (2) to (10) report results using different bandwidth sizes (our benchmark is a 5-mark
bandwidth) and rows (11) to (14) report specifications using parametric polynomial controls. In
rows (14) and (15) we include controls for the sum of marks and other marks separately to show
that our results are not driven by omission of other course grades. In row (16) we address the
concern that our results misrepresent students who are not domiciled in UK by looking only
at domiciled students. In row (17) we deal with the worry that bunching of marks around the
threshold reflects manipulation.
Employment outcomes appear to be sensitive to bandwidth choice. For the First Class some
specifications even suggest a negative effect on employment, e.g. rows (3) and (4). Likewise
for the Upper Second degree, employment overall and in finance does not display a consistent
pattern across specifications. To be conservative we interpret this as suggesting that the extensive
margin is not affected by degree class. This may be due to the limited variation we have in
employment and requires further investigation in future work. It also accords with the earlier
findings in Di Pietro (2010) who did not find significant effects on employment. In the following
sections we focus on the industry wage outcomes.
We find more consistent results for our preferred outcome of industry mean wages. Looking
at industry means for First Class degrees, we find effects significant at 5 percent ranging from
2.5 to 6.8 percent with the benchmark result of 3.3 percent. For Upper Second, the range is 5.7
20Assuming a 40 hour week for 52 weeks for a full time worker using 23 percent CPI inflation from 2005-2012.
First Class: exp(2.473)× 40× 52× 1.23× 0.033. Upper Second: exp(2.418)× 40× 52× 1.23× 0.071.
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to 13 percent with the benchmark of 7.1 percent.
5 Additional Results
5.1 Statistical Discrimination by Gender and Degree Programmes
The theories of statistical discrimination are closely related to signaling and screening
theories. In this section we explore differences in degree class across groups and explain this
in the context of a simple model of statistical discrimination. Table 8 splits the sample by
gender and estimates separate effects for males and females. We find that First Class effects are
significant and positive for males at 6 percent (£1,780 a year) but insignificant and basically
zero for females.21 Upper Second effects are larger in magnitude for males but imprecisely
estimated for both.Table 9 splits the sample by degree programmes. Using information on the
math entry requirements, we distinguish between programmes which required at least A-level in
maths and those which do not (see Table B.3). We interpret this as a measure of how quantitative
the programmes are. For both First Class and Upper Second, quantitative programmes display
larger and significant effects. Finally, in Table 10 we split the programmes by the number of
course options available to students. This measure is weighted by department size because larger
departments may mechanically offer more options. We interpret this measure as capturing how
heterogenous the transcripts are across programmes and thus how noisy the degree class signal
is. Programmes with less heterogenous transcripts may provide less noisy signals of ability. We
find that there are no significant differences for First Class, but for Upper Second, programmes
which have less course choices have larger and significant effects.
In Appendix Section A we present a simple model of statistical discrimination to rationalize
these findings. Employers observe group characteristics and discriminate on the basis of ability
distributions across groups. In our context, a First Class or Upper Second degree has a stronger
effect if a student belongs to a group that has higher expected ability, higher variance in abilities
or lower variance in the noise associated with the degree class signal.22 Table B.4 provides
summary statistics for the three group definitions we have used. We can explain the stronger
effects for males and quantitative programmes as resulting from the higher mean and variances
of these groups. Our interpretation of the number of course options available on programmes as
a measure of the noise in the signal is supported by the smaller variance in the Upper Second
sample for programmes with less options but does not explain the First Class sample.
These findings are suggestive of statistical discrimination but there could be alternative
explanations. First, we are cutting the sample quite finely and these results may simply be
statistical artifacts. Second, there may still be unobservable characteristics correlated with these
21Assuming a 40 hour week for 52 weeks for a full time worker using 23 percent CPI inflation from 2005-2012,
exp(2.454)× 40× 52× 1.23× 0.06.
22Both First Class and Upper Second are positive signals because we are always comparing to the next lower
class.
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group characteristics that employers observe but not the econometrician. Our results would then
reflect selection rather than statistical discrimination.23 Third, there may be non-statistical forms
of discrimination that generate these patterns.
Furthermore, these differences may not persist. The literature on employer learning argues
that any signal used in initial labor market outcomes attenuates over time as employers discover
more about ability (Altonji and Pierret 2001). An interesting research topic would be to follow
students over the course of their careers to see if these group differences do, in fact, become less
important.
5.2 Heterogeneity Across Ability Groups
As noted in Section 3 one shortcoming of our data is that we do not observe measures of
pre-university ability. To redress this, we split programmes by their A-level entry requirements,
as shown in Table B.3. There are four types of requirements measuring the grades that are
needed on A-level courses with A*AA being the highest followed by AAA, AAB and ABB. A
few points are worth noting. First, LSE is a selective school so these A-level grades reflect the
upper-end of the national distribution and there may be little difference between the abilities of
the ABB and A*AA students. Second, these grades reflect the typical offer made and there may
be heterogeneity even within a programme on the actual entry grades.24 Third, the choice of
programme is an endogenous decision and this programme-level measure of ability does not
distinguish between innate or acquired differences (Arcidiacono 2004).
In Table 11 we report the results of splitting our sample by ability, with high ability defined
as programmes with A*AA or AAA entry requirements.25 For the high ability group in panel
A we see that the First Class and Upper Second effects are similar–4.5 percent vs 5.3 percent
returns to a First Class. In panel B, the returns to an Upper Second are large and significant at
7.9 percent but the First Class coefficient is negative albeit imprecisely estimated.
If we are measuring ability correctly, these results are interesting and add to the literature
on employer learning and statistical discrimination. The fact that the returns to a First Class
or Upper Second are similar in the high ability group is consistent with Arcidiacono, Bayer,
and Hizmo (2010) who find that ability is revealed directly for high ability compared to lower
ability groups. There are two differences, however. First, they define all college graduates as
high ability while we split college students further and find differences even within a relatively
23The difference between statistical discrimination and selection is that in the former, employers and econome-
tricians both do not observe underlying ability and make inferences on the basis of observable factors (Weiss 1995).
With selection bias, employers observe characteristics that are not observed by the econometrician and thus statisti-
cal estimates are biased by these omitted factors. In principle, the RD strategy should mitigate selection effects
because we are comparing students who are close to the discontinuity.
24This is a particular issue in LSE with a large fraction of overseas students who may not have taken A-
levels.There are entry requirements based on the international baccalaureate and these map directly into A-level
grades.
25Table B.5 shows the correlation across the programme-level measures we have used. It shows that the variables
are not perfectly correlated and are thus unlikely to be capturing the same underlying measure.
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skill-homogenous group. Second, whereas they find that ability is revealed perfectly for high
ability types, here we find significant albeit modest returns to degree class. If productivity were
revealed perfectly for the high ability group we should find no First Class or Upper Second
effects at all.
Our finding that the Upper Second matters but not the First Class for the lower ability group
presents a puzzle. Going back to the simple model of statistical discrimination, an explanation
could be that the First Class is a noisier signal than the Upper Second for the lower ability group.
While we do not have a full explanation here, we think that this is an interesting area for future
research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the sorting effects of university degree class on initial labor market
outcomes using a regression discontinuity design that exploits institutional rules governing the
award of degrees. Consistent with anecdotal evidence, we find sizeable and significant effects
for Upper Second degrees and positive but smaller effects for First Class degrees on wages–we
find that a First Class and Upper Second are worth around £1,000 and £2,040 per annum
respectively. However, we do not find significant effects on the extensive margin of employment.
These results generally survive a battery of specification checks.
In additional results we explore differences across groups and find some evidence of statistical
discrimination on the basis of gender and types of degree programmes. We find that signaling
effects are stronger for males, quantitative degree programmes and programmes with less course
choices. We interpret these findings using a simple model of statistical discrimination. When
we split the sample by ability, we find that the signaling effects are similar in the high ability
group but stronger for Upper Second degrees in the lower ability group. We do not have a full
explanation of the differences across ability groups and propose that this is an area of interest
for future research.
Overall, the evidence points to the importance of sorting in the high skills labor market. It
would be interesting to study how these effects on initial labor market outcomes change over
time as employers learn more about workers.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
 
 
    Surveyed         
No. of 
obs Total 
First Class 
sample 
Upper 
Second 
sample 
Not 
surveyed 
Difference  
(1) - (4) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of observations 5912 2649 1136 1406 3263 
Female 5912 0.453 0.448 0.476 0.510 -0.0576*** 
Age 5912 22.06 22.03 22.06 22.10 -0.0358 
UK national 5912 0.604 0.586 0.656 0.416 0.187*** 
Resat any course 5912 0.104 0.0317 0.132 0.105 -0.00131 
Failed any course 5912 0.0615 0.0238 0.0782 0.0631 -0.00160 
First Class 5912 0.234 0.387 0 0.249 -0.0154 
Upper Second 5912 0.573 0.613 0.720 0.530 0.0431*** 
Lower Second 5912 0.193 0 0.280 0.221 -0.0277** 
4th highest mark 5912 65.10 68.63 61.31 65.08 0.0148 
1(4th mark ≥ 70) 5912 0.242 0.406 0 0.253 -0.0106 
1(4th mark ≥ 60) 5912 0.834 1 0.770 0.806 0.0272** 
Employed 2649 0.849 0.864 0.832  
Finance industry 2244 0.381 0.420 0.318  
Industry mean log wages 
(2005£)  
Industry mean 2244 2.454 2.473 2.418  
(0.239) (0.228) (0.246)  
College with 1 year 
experience 2244 2.142 2.155 2.113  
(0.184) (0.179) (0.190)  
College with 3 years 
experience 2244 2.338 2.350 2.311  
(0.179) (0.175) (0.186)  
College with 5 years 
experience 2244 2.481 2.495 2.452  
(0.186) (0.181) (0.192)  
Industry mean excluding 
finance industry 1389 2.378 2.398 2.351  
    (0.233) (0.221) (0.238)        
Notes: This table shows means and standard deviations in brackets where applicable. Surveyed students are 
respondents to the Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey conducted six months after a student 
graduates. Students who were not in the survey are included for comparison. The First Class sample includes surveyed 
students who received either a First Class or Upper Second degree and whose fourth highest mark is within 5 marks of 
70. The Upper Second sample includes surveyed students who received either an Upper Second or Lower Second 
degree and whose fourth highest mark is within 5 marks of 60. First Class, Upper Second and Lower Second are 
dummy variables for degree class. 4th highest mark is the fourth highest mark received by the student among all full-
unit equivalent courses taken. 1(4th mark ≥ 70) and 1(4th mark ≥ 60) are dummy variables for the fourth highest mark 
being at least 70 or 60, respectively. Employed is an indicator for whether a student is in employment 6 months after 
graduation. Self-employment, voluntary work and further studies are not considered employment. Finance industry is 
an indicator for working in the finance industry. Industry mean log wages are measures of hourly wages in two-digit 
SIC industry × year × gender cells. Two-digit SIC industry wage data is taken from the Labor Force Survey and 
rebased to 2005£.  
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Table 2: First Stage and Reduced Form Regressions of Labor Market Outcomes
on Instruments for First Class and Upper Second Degrees
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: First Class discontinuity 
Industry mean log wages 
First Class Employed 
Finance 
industry 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 
year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
1(4th mark ≥ 70) 0.67*** 0.0074 0.0066 0.022 0.014 0.0091 0.012 0.035 
(0.12) (0.034) (0.054) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.023) 
Observations 1,136 1,136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
R-squared 0.803 0.205 0.255 0.606 0.437 0.405 0.466 0.496 
First-stage F-stat 29.2 
Panel B: Upper Second discontinuity 
Industry mean log wages 
Upper 
Second Employed 
Finance 
industry 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 
year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
1(4th mark ≥ 60) 0.67*** -0.024 0.080 0.048** 0.036** 0.046** 0.032* 0.042* 
(0.078) (0.030) (0.050) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) 
Observations 1,406 1,406 1,168 1,168 1,168 1,168 1,168 796 
R-squared 0.722 0.103 0.203 0.484 0.353 0.321 0.368 0.405 
First-stage F-stat 74.8               
Notes: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by marks. Each cell reports a different 
regression. All regressions are estimated by OLS. All regressions include female dummies, age and age squared, dummies for 
being a UK national, dummies for having resat or failed any course, 15 dummies for department, 5 year dummies and 75 dummies 
for department × year interactions. Column (1) reports the first-stage regression of degree class on an indicator for marks crossing 
the relevant cutoff. The first stage F-stat for excluded instruments is reported in the last row of each panel.  
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Table 3: Testing the Randomization of Instruments Around the First Class and
Upper Second Discontinuities
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female Age 
UK 
national 
Resat any 
course 
Failed any 
course 
No. of 
students in 
each mark 
Panel A: First Class discontinuity 
1(4th mark ≥ 70) -0.00069 -0.16* 0.012 -0.00072 -0.0088 62.8 
(0.055) (0.071) (0.060) (0.022) (0.011) (40.0) 
Observations 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 1136 
Panel B: Upper Second discontinuity 
1(4th mark ≥ 60) 0.10** 0.12 -0.031 0.041 0.0022 80.8** 
(0.036) (0.38) (0.066) (0.054) (0.064) (31.9) 
Observations 1406 1406 1406 1406 1406 1406 
Notes: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by marks. Each cell 
reports a different regression. All regressions are estimated by OLS. All regressions include covariates, 15 
dummies for department, 5 year dummies and 75 dummies for department × year interactions. 
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Table 4: The Effects of Obtaining a First Class Degree Compared to an Upper
Second Degree on Labor Market Outcomes
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Industry mean log wages 
Employed 
Finance 
industry 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
Panel A: OLS without any covariates 
First Class 0.019 0.069 0.070*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.077*** 
(0.023) (0.042) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) 
Observations 1136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
Panel B: OLS 
First Class -0.022 0.013 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 0.052*** 
(0.019) (0.035) (0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0081) (0.0072) (0.013) 
Observations 1136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
Panel C: RD 
First Class 0.011 0.0099 0.033** 0.021 0.014 0.018 0.054** 
(0.045) (0.074) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) 
Observations 1136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
Notes: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by marks. Each cell reports a 
different regression. All regressions include female dummies, age and age squared, dummies for being a UK national, 
dummies for having resat or failed any course, 15 dummies for department, 5 year dummies and 75 dummies for 
department × year interactions. See notes to Table 1 for descriptions of variables. 
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Table 5: The Effects of Obtaining an Upper Second Degree Compared to a
Lower Second Degree on Labor Market Outcomes
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Industry mean log wages 
Employed 
Finance 
industry 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
Panel A: OLS without any covariates 
Upper Second -0.0040 0.029 0.020 0.0011 0.0014 0.0050 -0.0066 
(0.015) (0.022) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
Observations 1406 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 796 
Panel B: OLS 
Upper Second 0.027 0.069** 0.040*** 0.025** 0.027** 0.028** 0.028** 
(0.015) (0.030) (0.0085) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 1406 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 796 
Panel C: RD 
Upper Second -0.035 0.12** 0.071*** 0.052*** 0.067*** 0.048** 0.063** 
(0.043) (0.058) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) 
Observations 1406 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 796 
Notes: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by marks. Each cell reports a 
different regression. All regressions include female dummies, age and age squared, dummies for being a UK national, 
dummies for having resat or failed any course, 15 dummies for department, 5 year dummies and 75 dummies for 
department × year interactions. See notes to Table 1 for descriptions of variables. 
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Table 6: Specification Checks for First Class Degree
 
 
        Industry mean log wages 
Employed 
Finance 
industry 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 
year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
(1) Benchmark 0.011 0.0099 0.033** 0.021 0.014 0.018 0.054** 
(0.045) (0.074) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.024) 
1136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
(2) 1 mark above 0.033 0.19 0.018 0.016 0.023 0.0058 -0.12 
  and below disc. (0.12) (0.21) (0.058) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.12) 
310 270 270 270 270 270 150 
(3) 2 marks above 0.15 0.73* 0.20* 0.014 0.037 0.049 -0.21 
  and below disc. (0.28) (0.40) (0.11) (0.080) (0.091) (0.085) (1.00) 
537 469 469 469 469 469 252 
(4) 3 marks above -0.16** 0.25* 0.042** 0.010 0.014 0.0063 0.0089 
  and below disc. (0.065) (0.14) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.071) 
730 629 629 629 629 629 345 
(5) 4 marks above -0.12*** 0.21*** 0.068*** 0.050*** 0.038** 0.047*** 0.046* 
  and below disc. (0.026) (0.057) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.027) 
906 774 774 774 774 774 426 
(6) 6 marks above -0.017 0.0091 0.044*** 0.031*** 0.031** 0.027*** 0.074*** 
  and below disc. (0.030) (0.053) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.0099) (0.021) 
1346 1147 1147 1147 1147 1147 671 
(7) 7 marks above -0.012 -0.0096 0.025* 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.054*** 
  and below disc. (0.028) (0.037) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.018) 
1552 1322 1322 1322 1322 1322 790 
(8) 8 marks above -0.022 0.0048 0.038*** 0.032** 0.032** 0.029** 0.061*** 
  and below disc. (0.024) (0.037) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) 
1742 1478 1478 1478 1478 1478 884 
(9) 9 marks above -0.025 0.038 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.071*** 
  and below disc. (0.024) (0.043) (0.0089) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
1894 1602 1602 1602 1602 1602 953 
(10) 10 marks above -0.018 0.011 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.080*** 
  and below disc. (0.025) (0.043) (0.0073) (0.0082) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.015) 
2048 1735 1735 1735 1735 1735 1045 
(11) 2nd order polynomial 0.0093 0.054 0.043*** 0.033*** 0.026** 0.030** 0.058** 
(0.037) (0.055) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.024) 
1136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
(12) 3rd order polynomial -0.0057 0.11 0.049* 0.032 0.016 0.032 0.010 
(0.063) (0.13) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.033) 
1136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
(13) 4th order polynomial -0.13*** 0.20** 0.051* 0.029 0.015 0.026 0.011 
(0.029) (0.093) (0.029) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037) 
1136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
(14) 5th order polynomial -0.086* 0.025 -0.0019 -0.026 -0.036 -0.024 -0.0072 
(0.045) (0.14) (0.033) (0.047) (0.044) (0.040) (0.060) 
1136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
                  
(Continued) 
  
24
  
        Industry mean log wages 
Employed 
Finance 
industry 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 
year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
(14) Including controls 0.0095 0.0096 0.032** 0.020 0.013 0.017 0.052** 
  for sum of marks (0.044) (0.073) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022) 
1136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
(15) Including controls 0.011 0.021 0.034** 0.024 0.017 0.020 0.051** 
  for other marks (0.045) (0.073) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.023) 
1136 978 978 978 978 978 567 
(16) UK domicile sample -0.015 0.14 0.031 0.047** 0.035* 0.039** -0.0072 
(0.063) (0.094) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.040) 
701 585 585 585 585 585 367 
(17) Excluding marks -0.0016 0.0078 0.048*** 0.035** 0.036*** 0.028** 0.078*** 
  around disc. (0.062) (0.094) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) 
922 791 791 791 791 791 462 
                  
Notes: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by marks. This table reports specification 
checks of the benchmark model in Table 4, panel C. Each cell reports a different regression where the coefficients on First Class 
are reported in the first lines, standard errors in brackets and number of observations in the third lines. 
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Table 7: Specification Checks for Upper Second Degree
 
 
        Industry mean log wages 
Employed 
Finance 
industry 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 
year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
(1) Benchmark -0.035 0.12** 0.071*** 0.052*** 0.067*** 0.048** 0.063** 
(0.043) (0.058) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) 
1406 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 796 
(2) 1 mark above -0.0041 0.0056 0.095** 0.046 0.063 0.042 0.19*** 
  and below disc. (0.10) (0.12) (0.047) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.053) 
374 310 310 310 310 310 211 
(3) 2 marks above -0.14** 0.022 0.054 -0.017 0.0076 -0.016 0.14 
  and below disc. (0.070) (0.088) (0.053) (0.037) (0.044) (0.034) (0.096) 
665 546 546 546 546 546 367 
(4) 3 marks above -0.11* -0.014 0.082*** 0.043 0.064** 0.044 0.11** 
  and below disc. (0.063) (0.079) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.048) 
922 759 759 759 759 759 517 
(5) 4 marks above -0.029 0.068 0.093*** 0.061** 0.075** 0.065** 0.100*** 
  and below disc. (0.060) (0.074) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
1160 954 954 954 954 954 648 
(6) 6 marks above -0.018 0.13** 0.080*** 0.059** 0.072*** 0.054** 0.067** 
  and below disc. (0.038) (0.064) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) 
1582 1310 1310 1310 1310 1310 877 
(7) 7 marks above -0.0016 0.086 0.084*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 0.052*** 0.072*** 
  and below disc. (0.032) (0.060) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) 
1750 1448 1448 1448 1448 1448 962 
(8) 8 marks above -0.030 0.11** 0.064** 0.042* 0.051** 0.038* 0.035 
  and below disc. (0.035) (0.056) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.039) 
1925 1602 1602 1602 1602 1602 1047 
(9) 9 marks above -0.011 0.095* 0.057** 0.033 0.045** 0.033* 0.033 
  and below disc. (0.037) (0.054) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.032) 
1964 1637 1637 1637 1637 1637 1069 
(10) 10 marks above -0.014 0.055 0.047* 0.021 0.030 0.021 0.024 
  and below disc. (0.032) (0.058) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.027) 
2003 1672 1672 1672 1672 1672 1092 
(11) 2nd order polynomial -0.024 0.081 0.084*** 0.061*** 0.076*** 0.055*** 0.078*** 
(0.041) (0.075) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.025) 
1406 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 796 
(12) 3rd order polynomial 0.0060 -0.040 0.12*** 0.090*** 0.11*** 0.080*** 0.14*** 
(0.053) (0.076) (0.033) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) 
1406 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 796 
(13) 4th order polynomial -0.036 -0.11 0.12*** 0.071** 0.095*** 0.063* 0.16*** 
(0.066) (0.10) (0.046) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.042) 
1406 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 796 
(14) 5th order polynomial -0.035 -0.17 0.13*** 0.069** 0.10*** 0.053 0.18*** 
(0.067) (0.10) (0.045) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.047) 
1406 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 796 
                  
 (Continued) 
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        Industry mean log wages 
Employed 
Finance 
industry 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 
year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
(14) Including controls -0.037 0.11* 0.065** 0.047** 0.063*** 0.043** 0.060** 
  for sum of marks (0.042) (0.059) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) 
1406 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 796 
(15) Including controls -0.043 0.12* 0.071*** 0.052*** 0.067*** 0.046** 0.062** 
  for other marks (0.051) (0.060) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) 
1406 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168 796 
(16) UK domicile sample -0.083* 0.033 0.091*** 0.076*** 0.087*** 0.064*** 0.10*** 
(0.042) (0.059) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) 
974 792 792 792 792 792 574 
(17) Excluding marks -0.036 0.21*** 0.077*** 0.055*** 0.068*** 0.056*** 0.055* 
  around disc. (0.040) (0.033) (0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.029) 
1182 978 978 978 978 978 654 
                  
Notes: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by marks. This table reports 
specification checks of the benchmark model in Table 5, panel C. Each cell reports a different regression where the coefficients 
on Upper Second are reported in the first lines, standard errors in brackets and number of observations in the third lines. 
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Table 8: RD Estimates by Gender
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
Panel A: First Class Degree 
Male 
First Class 0.059*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.054 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.050) 
Observations 549 549 549 549 290 
Female 
First Class -0.022 -0.032 -0.032 -0.028 -0.034 
(0.029) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.057) 
Observations 429 429 429 429 277 
Panel B: Upper Second Degree 
Male 
Upper Second 0.084 0.081 0.089* 0.077 0.082 
(0.059) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.060) 
Observations 618 618 618 618 397 
Female 
Upper Second 0.052 0.034 0.036 0.029 0.062 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.037) (0.038) (0.075) 
Observations 550 550 550 550 399 
            
Notes: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered 
by marks 
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Table 9: RD Estimates by Programme Admissions Math Requirements
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
Panel A: First Class Degree 
At least A level maths 
First Class 0.063*** 0.045** 0.039** 0.039 0.12*** 
(0.015) (0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.047) 
Observations 576 576 576 576 259 
No math requirement 
First Class 0.038 0.0022 -0.0023 0.0029 0.034 
(0.036) (0.038) (0.041) (0.037) (0.031) 
Observations 402 402 402 402 308 
Panel B: Upper Second Degree 
At least A level maths 
Upper Second 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.091*** 0.17* 
(0.051) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.10) 
Observations 550 550 550 550 304 
No math requirement 
Upper Second -0.0042 -0.011 0.0049 -0.0036 -0.0066 
(0.042) (0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.031) 
Observations 618 618 618 618 492 
            
Notes: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered 
by marks.  
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Table 10: RD Estimates by Number of Course Options
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
Panel A: First Class Degree 
Degree programme has less course choices than median 
First Class 0.024 0.0092 -0.0046 -0.000027 0.055 
(0.066) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.082) 
Observations 458 458 458 458 288 
Degree programme has more course choices than median 
First Class 0.043 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.071* 
(0.030) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.041) 
Observations 520 520 520 520 279 
Panel B: Upper Second Degree 
Degree programme has less course choices than median 
Upper Second 0.12*** 0.086*** 0.10*** 0.084** 0.093** 
(0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.037) 
Observations 633 633 633 633 463 
Degree programme has more course choices than median 
Upper Second 0.0034 0.021 0.036 0.014 -0.027 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.032) 
Observations 535 535 535 535 333 
            
Notes: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered by marks.   
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Table 11: RD Estimates by Ability Groups
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Industry 
mean 
College 
with 1 year 
experience 
College 
with 3 
years 
experience 
College 
with 5 
years 
experience 
Industry 
mean excl. 
finance 
Panel A: Higher ability, A*AA or AAA requirements for A levels or equivalent 
First Class 0.045*** 0.032** 0.031** 0.030** 0.063** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.024) 
Observations 748 748 748 748 414 
Upper Second 0.053* 0.035 0.052** 0.028 0.048 
(0.028) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.035) 
Observations 770 770 770 770 487 
Panel B: Lower ability, AAB or ABB requirements for A levels or equivalent 
First Class -0.033 -0.036 -0.068 -0.051 0.018 
(0.091) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.098) 
Observations 230 230 230 230 153 
Upper Second 0.079** 0.074*** 0.088*** 0.073*** 0.057 
(0.031) (0.024) (0.021) (0.027) (0.045) 
Observations 398 398 398 398 309 
            
Notes: ***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are clustered 
by marks.  
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Figure 1: Expected Degree Classification and Fourth Highest Marks
 
 
 (a) Expected First Class degree, 10 marks above and below 70 
 
(b) Expected Upper Second degree, 10 marks above and below 60 
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Figure 2: Counting Compliers
 
 
 (a) Schematic 
  
Assignment variable is above 
threshold 
  0 1 
Degree Class 
0 Never takers + Compliers Never takers 
1 Always takers Always takers 
+ Compliers 
 
(b) First Class sample (N = 1,136) 
  4th highest mark is above 70  
  0 1  
First Class  
0 652 44 Always Takers = 3% = 
23/(23+652) 
Never Takers = 10% = 
44/(44+417) 
Compliers = 87% 
1 23 417 
 
(c) Upper Second sample (N = 1,406) 
  4th highest mark is above 60  
  0 1  
Upper 
Second 
0 307 87 Always Takers = 5% = 
16/(16+307) 
Never Takers  = 8% = 
87/(87+996) 
Compliers = 87% 
1 16 996 
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Figure 3: Histogram of Marks
 
 
(a) Fourth highest marks 
 
(b) Fifth highest marks 
 
(c) Highest marks 
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Figure 4: Expected Industry Mean Log Wages on Fourth Highest Marks
 
 
 (a) 10 marks above and below 70 
 
(b) 10 marks above and below 60 
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Appendices
A Simple Model of Statistical Discrimination
Statistical discrimination is closely related to signaling and screening theories of education
(Phelps 1972, Arrow 1973, Aigner and Cain 1977). In statistical discrimination, employers
differentiate across otherwise identical workers on the basis of observable group membership,
for e.g. race or gender. More recent versions of these models introduce the dynamics of learning
(Farber and Gibbons 1996, Lange 2007, Altonji and Pierret 2001, Arcidiacono, Bayer, and
Hizmo 2010).
In this section we interpret a simple model of statistical discrimination in the context of the
signaling value of degree class. Our exposition follows Aigner and Cain (1977) and Belman and
Heywood (1991) (see also Hungerford and Solon (1987) and Jaeger and Page (1996)).
Suppose employers observe a noisy signal of student ability–in our case the signal is the
fourth highest mark and resulting degree class. That is, the employer observes
y = q + u
where y is the fourth highest mark, q is unobserved ability and u is a normally distributed mean
zero random variable uncorrelated with q. Students know their own ability but employers only
see y and know that q is distributed with mean q¯ and some variance σq. Therefore, employers
solve a signal extraction problem:
E[q|y] = (1− γ)q¯ + γy
which is a regression of q on y where linearity follows from the normality assumption. The
regression coefficient can be written as:
γ =
σq
σq + σu
where σu is the variance of the noise term.
Additionally, employers observe a student’s group–in our case gender and type of degree
programme. Now suppose there are two groups, A and B, with means and variances q¯A, q¯B , σA
and σB. For any observed signal y, the difference in predicted ability between groups is:
E[q|y, A]− E[q|y,B] =(1− γA)q¯A + γAy − (1− γB)q¯B − γBy
=(q¯A − q¯B)(1− γB) + (y − q¯A)(γA − γB)
This formula gives us three predictions that we corroborate with the data. Given y,
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E[q|y, A]− E[q|y,B] > 0, if
1. q¯A − q¯B > 0
2. σAq − σBq > 0 and y > q¯
3. σAu − σBu < 0 and y > q¯.
In the data we interpret y as the fourth highest mark so q¯ = E[y]. The total variance can be
calculated as σy = σq+σu but we do not observe σq or σu separately. Because we do not observe
σu we cannot recover the exact importance of each factor in determining group differences. Our
application of the model to the data should necessarily be interpreted loosely. When we translate
the predictions to the data, at any given mark and degree class, a student from group A has a
higher predicted ability than an otherwise identical student from group B if group A has:
1. higher expected abilities;
2. higher variance in abilities and y is a positive signal;
3. lower variance in the noise term and y is a positive signal.
In our context, a positive signal is receipt of the higher degree class. Both First Class and
Upper Second are positive signals because we are always comparing to the next lower class. As
discussed in Section 5.1 we define groups by gender and degree programmes and find results
supportive of this simple model statistical discrimination.
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B Appendix Tables
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Table B.1: Mapping From Course Marks to Final Degree Class
 
 
Final degree class Course grade requirements 
First Class Honors 5 marks of 70 or above or  
4 marks of 70 or above and aggregate marks of at least 590 
Upper Second Class 5 marks of 60 or above or  
4 marks of 60 or above and aggregate marks of at least 515 
Lower Second Class 5 marks of 50 or above or  
4 marks of 50 or above and aggregate marks of at least 440 
  
Notes: Institutional rules governing award of degree class taken from  
http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/calendar/academicRegulations/BA-BScDegrees.htm  
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Table B.2: Top 15 Industries Ranked by Total Share of Employment
 
 
    Share of employment 
Industry (LFS, SIC two-digit) 
Industry mean 
log wages 
(2005£) Total 
First 
Class 
Upper 
Second 
Lower 
Second 
and 
below 
financial ex insurance and pension 2.58 38.10 47.90 36.28 31.00 
legal and accounting activities 2.52 16.22 21.21 14.43 15.15 
public admin, defence, social sec 2.35 7.44 5.85 8.52 6.29 
head offices; management consultanc 2.51 6.51 8.04 6.23 5.36 
insurance, reinsurance and pension 2.45 4.55 4.75 3.79 6.53 
education 2.36 3.88 2.01 4.97 3.03 
advertising and market research 2.48 2.01 1.10 2.37 2.10 
security & investigation activities 1.99 1.74 0.37 2.05 2.56 
office admin, support and other 2.15 1.52 0.18 1.58 3.03 
retail trade, except vehicles 1.88 1.47 0.73 1.58 2.10 
auxiliary to financial and insuranc 2.55 1.34 1.46 1.50 0.70 
other prof, scientific and technica 2.22 1.07 0.73 1.26 0.93 
publishing activities 2.40 0.85 0.37 0.87 1.40 
employment activities 2.24 0.80 0.18 1.18 0.47 
human health activities 2.24 0.80 0.18 0.87 1.40 
Notes: This table shows the industry mean log wages for all skills and experience groups. Industries are ranked 
by total share of employment. 
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Table B.3: A-Level Admissions Requirements for Degree Programmes
 
 
department programme 
No. of 
students 
More than 
median 
no. of 
options 
Math 
required 
A-level 
requirements 
Accounting 
BSc in Accounting and 
Finance 367 1 0 AAA 
Anthropology 
BA in Anthropology and 
Law 20 0 0 AAB 
Anthropology BA in Social Anthropology 26 0 0 AAB 
Anthropology BSc in Social Anthropology 63 0 0 AAB 
Economic History BSc in Economic History 72 0 0 AAB 
Economic History 
BSc in Economic History 
with Economics 8 0 1 AAB 
Economic History 
BSc in Economics and 
Economic History 30 0 1 AAB 
Economics 
BSc in Econometrics and 
Mathematical Economics 23 0 1 A*AA 
Economics BSc in Economics 510 1 1 A*AA 
Economics 
BSc in Economics with 
Economic History 11 0 1 A*AA 
Employment Relations and 
Organisational Behaviour 
BSc in Human Resource 
Management and 
Employment Relations 32 0 0 AAB 
Employment Relations and 
Organisational Behaviour 
BSc in Industrial Relations 
and Human Resource 
Management 7 0 0 AAB 
Geography & Environment BA in Geography 65 0 0 AAB 
Geography & Environment 
BSc in Environmental 
Policy 12 0 0 AAB 
Geography & Environment 
BSc in Environmental 
Policy with Economics 12 0 1 AAB 
Geography & Environment 
BSc in Geography and 
Population Studies 2 0 0 AAB 
Geography & Environment 
BSc in Geography with 
Economics 53 0 1 AAB 
Government BSc in Government 68 1 0 AAA 
Government 
BSc in Government and 
Economics 96 1 1 AAA 
Government 
BSc in Government and 
History 48 0 0 AAA 
International History BA in History 89 1 0 AAA 
International History 
BSc in International 
Relations and History 60 0 0 AAA 
International Relations 
BSc in International 
Relations 132 1 0 AAA 
Management Science 
Group 
BSc in Management 
Sciences 78 0 1 AAB 
Managerial Economics and 
Strategy Group BSc in Management 132 0 1 AAB 
Mathematics 
BSc in Mathematics and 
Economics 126 0 1 A*AA 
Philosophy BA in Philosophy 2 0 0 AAA 
Philosophy BSc in Philosophy 5 0 0 AAA 
Philosophy 
BSc in Philosophy and 
Economics 70 0 1 AAA 
Philosophy 
BSc in Philosophy, Logic 
and Scientific Method 30 0 0 AAA 
Social Policy BSc in Population Studies 1 0 0 ABB 
Social Policy BSc in Social Policy 21 0 0 ABB 
Social Policy 
BSc in Social Policy and 
Administration 5 0 0 ABB 
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Social Policy 
BSc in Social Policy and 
Criminology 11 0 0 ABB 
Social Policy 
BSc in Social Policy and 
Economics 11 0 1 ABB 
Social Policy 
BSc in Social Policy and 
Government 2 0 0 ABB 
Social Policy 
BSc in Social Policy and 
Sociology 11 0 0 ABB 
Social Policy 
BSc in Social Policy with 
Government 20 0 0 ABB 
Social Policy 
BSc in Social Policy with 
Social Psychology 1 0 0 ABB 
Social Policy 
BSc in Social Policy, 
Criminal Justice and 
Psychology 10 0 0 ABB 
Sociology BSc in Sociology 77 0 0 ABB 
Statistics BSc in Actuarial Science 137 0 1 AAA 
Statistics 
BSc in Business 
Mathematics and Statistics 93 0 1 AAA 
Notes: Admissions requirements for degree programmes. Taken from 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/study/undergraduate/degreeProgrammes2013/degreeProgrammes2013.aspx. More than median 
number of options indicates whether a degree programme has more than the student-weighted median number of 
course choices offered to students. This offers a raw measure of how diverse the transcripts are across programmes. 
Math required is a dummy variable for whether the programme requires A-level maths for admissions. This is a 
measure of how quantitative the programme is. A-level requirements display the typical grades required for entry into 
the programme and is an indicator of the minimum student ability.  
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Table B.4: Summary Statistics by Groups
 
 
  First Class Sample   Upper Second Sample 
4th Mark 
mean 
4th Mark 
S.D. 
4th Mark 
mean 
4th Mark 
S.D. 
By gender 
Male 67.56 6.00 62.33 4.47 
Female 66.60 5.40 62.32 4.32 
By math requirements 
At least A level maths 68.74 6.57 62.33 4.75 
No math requirement 65.39 4.07 62.32 4.06 
By number of course choices 
Less choices than median 67.08 6.21 62.26 4.27 
More choices than median 67.18 5.23   62.40 4.54 
Notes: This table shows summary statistics by gender and programme characteristics.  
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Table B.5: Correlations Between Programme Level Measures
 
 
  Mean 
More than 
median no. 
of options 
Math 
required 
A-level 
score 
A*AA or 
AAA 
More than median no. of 
options 0.47 1.00 
Math required 0.52 -0.09 1.00 
A-level score A*AA or AAA 0.70 0.62 0.14 1.00 
Notes: Each variable is a programme-level dummy variable described in detail in the 
main text. This table shows mean and correlations weighted by number of students.  
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